Missing the policy window

Conspiracy theories about what actually happened on the outskirts of Abbottabad on the 1st of May aside, one of the upshots of those events has been a more open re-examination (at least in some of the English language dailies) of the military’s role in Pakistan’s state. This is partly due to the following:

1. The military carves out a considerable chunk of the federal budget, dominates security and foreign policy making and extracts a number of economic advantages for itself and its members. It does this, ostensibly, on the grounds that Pakistan has urgent and difficult security concerns (which define all foreign relations) and that the military – being the professional and above-reproach institution that it is – is best-suited for this task.
2. The military has been caught (at least apparently) either colluding with the most wanted terrorist in the world OR napping at the wheel … twice. First, remaining unaware of the presence of Osama Bin Laden. Second, while US special forces spent at least an hour and half flying to and back from Abbottabad on US military helicopters. In the middle of that trip they are supposed to have conducted a military operation to kill Bin Laden.

There are, of course, some in Pakistan’s ‘opinionati‘ who cannot pull off the Orwellian task of holding both beliefs 1 and 2 in their heads without perishing in an explosion of illogic.

Akbar Zaidi writes, “… the abject and humiliating failures of the military have been well-documented by scholars and historians.

“Most recently, the military’s bluff has been called and it is clear that it has been unable to determine whose interests it serves, what those interests are and, hence, its inability to defend those interests. … The falsity of the notion of the national security state has once again been laid bare.

…

“Pakistan’s state, in fact, is a national insecurity state and has been for some years now. The military’s inability to protect anyone’s interests other than its own narrow ones, in terms of economic and material privileges, underscores this impression.”

Others have argued that this is an ideal opportunity to thoroughly reassess the position of the military within the state’s hierarchy. Ayesha Siddiqa wrote just a week after the incident:

“It is the first time after 1972 that the civilian government has an opportunity to question the unlimited powers of the defence establishment. There is a need to partner with other political actors, especially the PML-N, which may be keen to reign in the armed forces, to create a mechanism for disciplining the institution. The fact is that if the political forces won’t do it now, they may never get another opportunity again.”

Ms. Siddiqa may have hoped against political expediency, in favor of institutional reform. Civilians taking a stand against military dominance for democracy. Political expediency is the name of the game in Pakistan, though.

Cyril Almeida argues that the opportunity for reform is passing us by right now. All the political actors (including the military brass) have read their cards and placed their bets.

“If you happen to believe the civil-military imbalance — the euphemism for the army’s internal predominance — is asphyxiating democracy in Pakistan, and by extension the overall progress of the country, then the Asif Zardari-Gen Kayani era has been yet another missed opportunity for the civilians.”

And with that another opportunity to right the balance of the Pakistani state is likely gone.

You can read Mr. Zaidi’s article here, Ms. Siddiqa’s here and Mr. Almeida’s here.